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Abstract
Evolutionary approaches to the explanation of human behavior are often employed in
hypotheses about the toleration and punishment of freeriders. Despite the explanatory
potential of evolutionary perspectives, many such perspectives ignore the unique human
factor that has influenced the economic, social, and political contexts within which, up until
very recently in human existence, reactions to freeriding always occurred. This human factor
is the role of cultural traditions (i.e., behaviors passed down from ancestors to descendants).
Cultural traditions necessarily play an important role in identifying, defining, preventing,
and determining the treatment of freeriders because many traditional moral codes apply
specifically to socioeconomic exchanges in which freeriding occurs. In this paper, we use the
cross-cultural record to examine the traditions that are used for identifying freeriders and
defining their punishment.
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Introduction
Explaining the treatment of freeriders—those who reap the benefits of collective action in
social and economic exchanges while paying few or none of the costs—is the current focus of
much research. When people cannot be excluded from a benefit provided by others, each
individual is motivated to reap these benefits without contributing to the joint effort—they are
motivated to freeride on the efforts of others (Ostrom, 1990, p. 6). Freeriding may preclude
collective action all together, as it frequently does in large, latent groups, in which monitoring for
freeriders is difficult or impossible. In these cases, without negative incentives to discourage
freeriding or positive incentives to encourage cooperation, people are unlikely to act collectively
(Olson, 1965). For example, any large category of people—college students, consumers, the
poor, etc.—could cooperate to gain a benefit—health insurance for college students, lower prices
for consumers, better schools for the poor—but the risks of freeriding in such large groups are
high, as are the costs of monitoring, and collective action is difficult. Freeriding may also lead to
the eventual demise of common-pool resources and collective efforts. Garrett Hardin (1968)
provided an often-cited hypothetical example of this “tragedy of the commons,” in which
“rationally acting” herdsmen sharing common grazing land would increase the size of their herds
without regard for the carrying capacity of the land. Because each herdsman gains all of the
benefits from adding additional animals but pays only a fraction of the costs to the common
resource (grazing land) shared by all herdsmen, each herdsman is compelled to “increase his
herd without limit—in a world that is limited” (Hardin, 1968, p. 246), leading to the eventual
depletion and failure of the commons. In smaller-group interactions, cooperation may also be
threatened by freeriding, but transparency and proximity allow for better, less costly monitoring,
and the importance of personal reputation and fear of punishment may be effective deterrents to
freeriding.
Despite the potential for freeriding in any exchange, cooperation persists, and often,
though not always, freeriders face punishment for their failure to reciprocate. We contend that
the persistence of cooperation depends largely on the decision to either punish or tolerate
freeriders. This decision to tolerate or punish is of fundamental significance to understanding
cooperative behavior in humans. In this paper, we review evolutionary theories regarding the
treatment of freeriders. We argue that these theories often ignore a very human factor that has
influenced the economic, social, and political contexts within which, up until very recently in
human existence, reactions to freeriding always occurred—the role of cultural traditions (i.e.,
behaviors, including talk, that are passed through generations, from ancestors to descendants).
The role of cultural traditions as passed on through kin has long been acknowledged within
anthropology and other disciplines, but in many of today’s evolutionary approaches to the
explanation of human cooperation, such traditions are rarely considered. Even the kinship
through which these traditions are transmitted has been argued to be largely irrelevant in
explanations of human cooperation (e.g. Hill et al., 2011).
However, traditions are of paramount importance to explaining the toleration or
punishment of freeriders because cultural traditions include prescribed rules or “moral codes”
about how to behave towards kin as well as toward other individuals in all forms of social
interaction. In “traditional” societies, moral codes exert tremendous influence over the social
behavior of individuals (March, 1978; Coe & Palmer, 2007; Steadman & Palmer, 2008; Palmer,
2009). As such, while we agree that evolutionary approaches can begin to explain complex
human economic behaviors such as decisions to tolerate or punish freeriders, we propose that
these approaches, to be accurate, must also incorporate cultural traditions into the causes of these
behaviors.
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The Evolutionary Perspective on the Treatment of Freeriders
Explanations of cooperation are a central theme in recent evolutionary studies of human
behavior, and the potential problem of freeriders arises in nearly all of these studies. Freeriding
presents obvious benefits and therefore threatens to undermine any cooperative endeavor.
Despite the risk of entering into an exchange relationship with a potential freerider, however,
humans often participate in transactions that are not based on immediate or exact reciprocity
(Boyd, 1992; Hawkes, 1993; Roberts, 1998; Gurven et al., 2000; Hames, 2000; Hawkes et al.,
2001; McAndrew, 2002; Patton, 2005). Because of the pervasiveness of the freerider problem,
evolutionists suggest that natural selection should have favored traits—usually proposed as
evolved psychological mechanisms—that enhance abilities to detect and deter freeriders. Further,
the punishment of freeriders, which often comes at a cost to the punisher, may be necessary to
maintain cooperation. This complex problem of maintaining cooperation, with the costs
associated with punishment and the threat of exploitation by freeriders, has produced
evolutionary explanations that describe how freeriders are avoided and deterred and, in some
cases, why they are tolerated.
One way to escape the persistent problem of freeriders is to quickly identify them and
avoid them as exchange partners. Cosmides and Tooby (1989, 1992) suggest that such detection
and avoidance mechanisms arise through and function within exchange relationships between
individuals in which there are opportunities and incentives for economically parasitic behaviors.
For example, long-term exchange relationships are sometimes limited to individuals who interact
on a frequent basis, who have knowledge of each other’s hardships and gains, and who, because
of this long-term relationship, feel a strong sense of obligation to reciprocate (Sahlins, 1972;
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Roberts, 1998; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). Such caution in
selecting exchange partners may decrease the frequency of being exploited by a freerider, but it
cannot completely eliminate this risk. Therefore, freeriders are also deterred by punishment.
Such punishment is sometimes referred to as “strong reciprocity” (Gintis, 2000; Bowles &
Gintis, 2001; Fischbacher & Gacher, 2002) and “altruistic punishment” (Fehr & Gachter, 2000,
2002; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Fehr, 2004; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Fowler, 2005), and
these concepts usually involve cooperators acting altruistically toward other altruists and
punishing those who are uncooperative (Boehm, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Fishbacher &
Gachter, 2002).
Although potentially effective in deterring freeriding, the punishment of freeriders creates
another evolutionary puzzle—because, as Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) argue, the punishment
of freeriders itself constitutes a form of altruism. The punisher must endure the costs of time,
effort, and sometimes risk involved in punishing freeriders, while non-punishing cooperators
reap the benefits without any of these costs. Basically, altruism on the part of the punisher
creates both a second-order public good and an opportunity for non-punishing cooperators to
become freeriders themselves. In such a situation, a would-be punisher may be better off
deciding not to incur the cost of punishment at all, instead allowing all cooperators to incur the
collective losses that result from the actions of freeriders (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).
Here again, despite the economic rationality of minimizing both the likelihood of secondorder freeriding and the costs associated with punishing, freeriders are often punished. Keeping
in mind that punishment of freeriders is actually a form of altruism, the explanations put forth to
explain why individuals routinely undertake the task of punishing freeriders are based on
explanations of other acts of altruism. For example, many explanations of toleration and
punishment of freeriders focus on the concept of “indirect reciprocal altruism” (Alexander,
1978). In these cases, the act of punishing freeriders serves as a hard-to-fake signal that indicates
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an inherent quality of the punisher—willingness to act altruistically and cooperatively. By
gaining a reputation as an altruist, the punisher receives benefits through cooperation with
individuals who receive these signals, become aware of the punisher’s altruism, and who, as a
result, are more likely to enter into social or economic exchange relationships with the punisher
(Bliege-Bird et al., 2001, 2002; Hawkes, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993; McAndrew, 2002; Hawkes &
Bliege-Bird, 2002; Smith et al., 2003). When there are multiple individuals signaling their
altruism by their punishment of freeriders, signals may become more intense or more frequent in
competitions to be the most altruistic. This is known as “competitive altruism,” even when it
takes the form of altruism through punitive measures (Pollack & Dugatkin, 1992; Roberts, 1998;
Barclay, 2004; Hardy & Vugt, 2006). In the ethnographic literature, there are many examples of
avoiding or deterring freeriders through punishment, but there are also many examples of
freeriders being tolerated.
The toleration of freeriders, like the act of punishing freeriders, can be conceived of as a
form of altruism, and thus, the evolutionary explanations addressing the toleration of freeriders
also focus on evolutionary explanations of altruism. Freerider toleration among close kin is
readily explained by the theory of ‘kin selection’ (Hamilton, 1964), based on the premise that
individuals have evolved to act altruistically when the benefits to those who carry their genes
outweigh the personal costs incurred through the altruistic act. Evolutionary explanations of the
toleration of freeriders who are not close kin again center on reciprocal altruism or indirect
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Alexander, 1987; Brembs, 1996; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Lotem et al., 1999, 2003; Wedekind & Melinski, 2000; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001).
In some cases, the toleration of freeriding may be simple reciprocal altruism with
exchange partners agreeing to terms of mutual freeriding (“you tolerate my freeriding today and I
will tolerate your freeriding in the future”). Explanations based on indirect reciprocal altruism
are again based on the premise that the toleration of unrelated freeriders is a means of signaling
to other people that the “tolerator” is an altruist and, thus, a “good” person and a likely
cooperator. Thus, these explanations predict that selection might have favored psychological
mechanisms leading individuals to build reputations for being altruistic in some social
environments (Palmer, 1991) by communicating cooperative tendencies through altruistic acts
such as tolerating individuals who freeride on the efforts of cooperators. Again, the benefits that
subsequently result from such altruistic reputations will be an increased number of individuals—
those who witnessed the altruistic acts—who are willing to initiate and maintain cooperation
with the altruist. In some situations, individuals may once again engage in competitive altruism
(i.e., competitive toleration of freeriders) in order to establish that they are more altruistic than
other individuals.
Despite the explanatory potential of these evolutionarily based theories, such theories
ignore what has been a crucial and pervasive influence on human behavior for tens of thousands
of years: the influence of cultural traditions on social and economic transactions, including
freeriding. Incorporating an understanding of the role of cultural traditions is therefore crucial to
our understanding and explanation of the treatment of freeriders. Part of the reason cultural
traditions have not been given enough attention is that much of the research on freeriding is
based on “investigations using game theory and experiments” (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p.125).
Even when these experiments are applied to people living in traditional cultures (Henrich et al.,
2004), the artificial setting of the game makes the relationship between the results and the
naturally occurring traditional behaviors uncertain. More fundamentally, the dominant
theoretical approach today—evolutionary psychology—does not typically include a role for the
influence of cultural traditions on behavior. For example, consider the absence of cultural
traditions among the long list of factors seen as influencing human behavioral decisions in the
following statement by Krebs and Hemmingway (2008, p. 36):
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From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, understanding
human behavior entails determining the operating principles of
mental mechanisms, that is to say, discovering the relevant
instructions, programs, computational procedures, or algorithms
that people use to make decisions that affect the probability that
they will survive, reproduce and propagate their genes.
To partially correct this situation while improving the explanatory ability of our hypotheses
regarding freeloading, we examine how and the extent to which cultural traditions influence
social behavior, including economic transactions potentially involving freeriding.
Cultural Traditions and the Treatment of Freeriders
We use the term “tradition” to refer to cultural (i.e., socially learned or “copied”)
behaviors “transmitted from ancestor to descendant, generally parent to child, [often] over many
generations” (Coe, 2003, p.5) or simply “behaviors copied from ancestors” (Palmer, 2009), and
we see traditions as being of paramount importance in understanding human behavior and human
evolution. In contrast to common perceptions of “cultures” and “societies” as primordial
certainties in both cultural and evolutionary explanations of human behavior, we view cultural
traditions and culture or society as inseparable. Traditions, passed down over generations are the
cause for those behaviors considered “cultural” and the shared characteristics that define a
“society.” The networks of kin (i.e., co-descendants of common ancestors) are often falsely
reified by the label of “a culture” or “a society” (see Murdock, 1971). However, societies are
actually epiphenomenal—generated by individual humans who reproduce and pass on two
crucial traditions to their offspring and influence their offspring to pass on those same two
traditions to descendants over many generations. These two key traditions, across societies, are
(1) the passing of a symbol from parent to offspring that identifies kin and (2) the passing of
instructions to descendants to cooperate with (e.g., be altruistic toward, favor, support in conflict)
individuals who are identified as kin. The first tradition—descent reckoning—is facilitated by
the use of descent names and/or some form of body adornment (Palmer & Steadman, 1997; Coe,
2003), and the second tradition has been called the “axiom of kinship amity” (Fortes, 1969).
Beginning at least several tens of thousands of years ago, the social environments that our
ancestors created required these two types of traditions. Giving offspring some symbol that they
are your descendants, such as a descent name, and influencing your offspring to copy your
behavior (see Palmer & Steadman, 1997) are crucial because it is when—and only when—these
traditions exist and are copied relatively perfectly over many generations that “large lineages or
clans . . . [expanding] over time as the descendants of the original ancestor/ancestress”
accumulate (Fox, 1967, p. 122).
The first of these two traditions, descent reckoning, is responsible for the formation of
what is understood to be ancestral lineages or clans. It is important to note here that this
formation of lineages and clans occurs through the passing of descent names from literal
ancestors to their descendants. Thus, the co-descendants who form the living members of a
lineage or clan are literally kin (related by birth links) to each other. (There are, of course,
exceptions when an individual who is not descended from a clan member might be adopted into
a clan; however, such instances are indeed exceptions.) It is actual kinship between individuals
with the same descent name that has caused anthropologists to distinguish what they label a
“descent group” from all of the other categories, such as age grades or co-residence groups.
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individuals assert the existence of fictive (i.e., metaphorical) kinship with a large number of
unrelated individuals. Rather, lineages and clans consist instead of large numbers of kin,
including very distantly related kin, who are identified as actual kin by virtue of sharing a name
acquired only from an actual ancestor. 1 The extension of kinship to distant kin is described by
Alexander (1979, p.156; as cited in Murdock, 1949, p. 14):
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Some of the intimacy characteristic of relationships within the
nuclear family tends to flow outward along the ramifying channels
of kinship ties . . . [When an individual] needs assistance or
services beyond what his family . . . can provide, he is more likely
to turn to his secondary, tertiary, or remoter relatives than to
persons who are not his kinsmen.
It should be noted that this extension of actual kinship identification and kinship cooperation
among even very distant kin is distinct from the notion that unrelated individuals may appear to
be “like” kin in some way (i.e., fictive kin).
Consistent with our hypothesis that the extension of actual kinship is the result of the
cultural tradition of descent reckoning, Alexander points out that this extension of kinship is only
found in traditional societies and is absent in nontraditional modern societies, saying that for
“most people in a modern technological society, . . . the significance of distinguishing relatives
decreases beyond some level, such as that of first cousins, because of low relatedness. . .” (1979,
pp.148, 149). 2 Thus, the cultural tradition of descent reckoning appears to have extended kinship
cooperation toward more distant kin than would be predicted by kin selection (freerider
toleration among close kin) alone. That is, although there is still a lessening of altruism with
kinship distance (e.g., greater altruism among third cousins than fifth cousins), the amount of
altruism at all levels of genealogical distance exceeds the amount expected on the basis of
coefficients of relatedness alone. We argue that the degree to which this is true is probably
related to the ability of ancestors to successfully influence descendants via traditions. The
greater the influence of traditions, the more frequently altruism among distant kin exceeds
predictions based on only coefficients of relatedness (see Coe et al., 2010).
Although the correlation between individuals sharing the same descent name and actual
kinship was probably quite high in past traditional societies, a greater amount of metaphorical
inclusion of non-kin into purportedly kinship-based categories of people has probably taken
place as traditions have deteriorated in recent times. Still, descent (as a function of cultural
tradition) appears to remain, implicitly and very often explicitly, the essential element of the
definition of those groups of “significant others” that go under a wide variety of labels: tribe,
band, horde, deme, ethnic group, race, nation, and nationality (Van den Berghe, 1981). Even
leading proponents of ethnicity as a social construction acknowledge that “. . . ethnic
membership is at once a question of source of origin as well as of current identity” (Barth 1969,
p. 29, emphasis added).
The identification of large numbers of individuals as kin would be useless without the
second tradition: the passing of instructions to descendants, which influences these large
numbers of identified co-descendants to cooperate with each other. This second tradition has
1

It is also important to note that simply using a species of animal (e.g., totem) for a descent name does not make the
genealogical links between the individuals inheriting that name from a common ancestor necessarily metaphorical or
mystical.
2
This pattern is particularly significant because it is only in recent modern non-traditional societies that kinship
behavior is “consistent with a Darwinian model” (Alexander 1979, p.149) based on the calculations of kin selection.
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consisted of influencing offspring to cooperate with individuals identified as kin, and to copy
that behavior, influencing the offspring’s offspring to do the same. The existence of such a
tradition of prescribing behaviors is succinctly demonstrated by a saying among the Lugbara of
Africa: “The rules of social behaviour are the ‘words of our ancestors’” (Middleton, 1960, p. 27).
The potential consequences of kinship identification and kinship cooperation being copied over a
great many generations is illustrated by the fact that the axiom of kinship amity “applies to all of
the Tiv” (Fortes, 1969, p. 237), where, as described by Keesing (1975, p. 32-33), “the whole
population of some 800,000 traces descent by traditional genealogical links from a single
founding ancestor” (Palmer, 2008).
Understanding the importance of both these two cultural traditions is important to
understanding recent human evolution because all humans lived in very traditional societies until
the last few thousand years, and most humans lived in traditional societies until the last few
hundred years. Societies referred to as “traditional” thus resemble these earlier societies. Such
societies typically consist of individuals identified as kin by virtue of being perceived as
descendants of common ancestors. In the more purely kinship-based and traditional societies
known in the ethnographic record, we suggest that the behavioral rules of conduct and the
systems that support them (e.g., processes for identifying guilt, punishing offenders, enacting
legislation, preventing conflict) are aimed at promoting a moral economy (Thompson, 1971; see
also Scott,1977) in which cooperative relationships among individuals who are identified as kin
through common ancestry endure over generations (see Coe & Palmer, 2009; Coe, 1995).
Examples of common ancestors being the source of moral prescriptions concerning
proper social behaviors that have been passed down from ancestors to current generations of codescendants are ubiquitous in the ethnographic record. For example, Fürer Haimendorf (1967, p.
148) claimed that Gond philosophy “leaves no doubt that the rules of behavior laid down in the
ancestor’s time remain binding for present generations.” Culwick and Culwick (1935, p. 8) also
write that primitive law was ancestral: “All of it [primitive law], is neither more nor less than the
rules of behaviour ordained by the ancestors.” Hoebel (1949, p. 366) writes that the source of the
behavioral codes found in kinship-based societies are ancestors; Edel and Edel (1959, p. 87) state
that moral codes are said to “be based on the practices of one’s own ancestors,” and Sumner
(1907, p. 232) writes that moral codes “contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral
ghosts.” These rules often have no other justification than “we do it this way because the old men
say it is wiser” (Sun Chief, 1942, p. 268), or “it was the custom of their ancestors” (Tylor, 1960
[1881], p. 252), or it is now our “duty” to our ancestors to behave the way they specified (Edel &
Edel, 1959; Johnson,1984; Westermarck, 1912). Even in a study emphasizing the diversity of
Australian Aboriginal societies, Keen (2004, p. 244) states:
We shall see the people of several of the regions, perhaps all of them,
shared a concept that can be translated as ‘ancestral law’ or the ‘proper
way,’ having its origin in the intentions and actions of the totemic creator
ancestors.
‘Ancestral Law’ in Aboriginal Australia is associated with the concept of ‘The Dreaming,’ a time
when the original ancestors created the traditions that their descendants have been encouraged to
follow ever since.
To fully understand the importance of cultural traditions specifying proper behavior
toward kin, it must be remembered that such traditional rules of behavior were not merely
something that occurred within a larger and pre-existing thing known as “a society” or “a
culture.” These rules were applied to individuals identified as kin by descent reckoning (e.g.,
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names), and they influenced the way individuals behaved toward identified kin. In this sense,
these rules were “the society” and “the culture.” For example, Keen writes that in Australia
before colonization, “kinship and society were co-extensive” (2004, p. 174; Maddock, 1972).
Kendon also states that “kin relationships govern every aspect of social life in Australian
Aboriginal society” (1988, p. 330), and Elkin states kinship “is the basis of [behavior]; indeed, it
is the anatomy and physiology of Aboriginal society” (Elkin, 1979 [1964], p. 56,85; RadcliffeBrown, 1931). Finally, Wolf (1984, p. 398) writes that “. . . the kin-ordered mode depends vitally
on symbolic understandings of who is and who is not kin,” and this “. . . imparts a characteristic
directionality, a vectorial force to the formation and propagation of ideas. Thus, the operations of
the kin-ordered mode generate claims to resources and services and apportion these resources
and services among rival claimants within and between groups.” The use of kinship to distribute
resources and services depends, of course, “vitally on symbolic understandings of who is and
who is not kin and upon a “symbolic [understanding] of what binds or distinguishes bodies of
kin, or binds and distinguishes categories of kinsmen and affines” (Wolf, 1984, p.398). As these
examples illustrate, there is a fundamental connection between identifying kin and allocating
resources. Therefore, it is inevitable that an understanding of economic transactions, including
freeriding, would benefit from an examination of traditional moral codes.
An important aspect of traditional moral codes is that they are often stated in terms of
obligations: The obligations of kinship govern a person’s behavior from his earliest years to his
death and affect life in all its aspects: in conversation, visiting, and camping; at the crises of life,
namely, childbirth, initiation, marriage, sickness, and death; and in quarrels and fights (Elkin,
1979 [1964], p. 118). These obligations are often described as being both to one’s ancestors and
to one’s co-descendants. For example, Gladwin (1953, p. 135) points out that “recently deceased
ancestors [are said] to punish the lineage members for their neglect of their family obligations.”
Among the Ndembu, Turner writes, the “moral man” is one who “[honors] his kinship
obligations” and “respects and remembers his ancestors” (Turner, 1979, p. 374). The difference
between this “obligation” to follow traditional moral codes and the psychological mechanisms
governing the punishment of freeriders proposed by evolutionary psychologists is clearly stated
by Rattray (1929, p. xx), who explained in his book on Ashanti law, “the unwritten, uncodified,
unclassified rules of conduct” were followed, not out of fear of punishment, but almost
unconsciously from time immemorial.” Thus, when a form of punishment occurs in traditional
societies, it is not merely the result of an individual’s evolved psychological mechanisms.
Instead, the punishment is part of the cultural traditions passed down from ancestors that
individuals feel obliged to obey regardless of their personal opinions. In other words, “The
ancestors who gave the rules are said to [continue to] participate in social life, rewarding those
who obey [the ancestors’ rules] and punishing those who violate [them]” (Coe & Palmer, 2007,
p. 9). Thus, in traditional societies, to act morally is one’s duty to the ancestors; morals are not
justified by a claim that they are “just” or “fair.” Warren (1973, p. 32) writes that “[t]he ancestors
among the Akan are not ‘worshipped’ as such; rather they are venerated, and they are invoked to
ensure their cooperation with and aid to the living.” In the world of the ancestral spirits
(asamando), it is believed that the ancestors live as they did on earth. The living have a sense of
dependence on the ancestors; it is believed that the ancestors are constantly watching over their
living relations and punishing those who break customs.
The relevance of traditional moral codes specifically to economic transactions is seen in
Hiatt’s observation that “traditional values and expectations” regarding interactions between kin
include “the ethic of generosity” (Hiatt, 1982, p. 23; see also Elkin, 1979 [1964], p. 118). Often
traditional stories taught individuals to be generous and share. Ilyatjari (1998, p. 4) provides
specific examples of parents telling their offspring traditional stories and teaching them
accompanying rituals that “taught them to share”: They told these kinds of stories, about a man,
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or a good child, or a bad child who was hit or a child who was bad was punished. Ilyatjari
explains, “These are the things they taught us using the leaves: living good lives, about a man
getting plenty of meat and about sharing everything.”
Traditions such as these can be seen as influencing freeriding in two ways. First,
traditions in the form of traditional enculturation practices change the calculations that are used
to identify freeriding and distinguish it from acceptable forms of reciprocity. Second, traditional
moral codes stipulate the degree, form, and method of punishment for social transgressions such
as freeriding. Both of these traditional influences are often overlooked simply because they are
taken for granted. For example, Turnbull’s well known description of the “crime of Cephu”
(1961, p. 94) involves a clear example of freeriding. The crime occurs within the context of the
“molimo,” which is the name of a complex set of claims involving a type of trumpet and various
related behaviors, some of which stipulate that individuals should contribute various kinds of
offerings to be shared by everyone living together. For example, individuals are obligated to
contribute food to the “molimo bakset.” Turnbull describes how one man, Cephu, “had refused
to contribute to the molimo basket” (1961, p. 97). Although this freeriding was disapproved of,
it was tolerated until Cephu also committed “one of the greatest sins possible” (ibid.) among the
Mbuti. During a communal hunt, Cephu “had slipped away from the others and set up his net in
front of them” (Turnbull, 1961, p. 106). This act was seen as equivalent to stealing meat from
others. In response, other individuals confronted Cephu and listed “the various ways in which
Cephu had defaulted” (Turnbull, 1961, p. 106) on his obligations to contribute (i.e., engaged in
freeriding). Turnbull then describes how Cephu’s freeriding was punished (1961, pp. 109 – 110):
The case was settled simply and effectively, without any evident
legal system being brought into force. It cannot be said that Cephu
went unpunished, because for those few hours when nobody would
speak to him, he must have suffered the equivalent of as many days
solitary confinement for anyone else. To have been refused a chair
by a mere youth, not even one of the great hunters; to have been
laughed at by women and children; to have been ignored by men—
none of these things would be quickly forgotten. Without any
formal process of / law Cephu had been firmly put in his place, and
it was unlikely he would do the same thing again in a hurry.
Turnbull summarizes such ways of dealing with freeriders in a way compatible with explanations
based on the second-order costs involved in the punishment of freeriders: “In a small and cooperative group, no individual would want the job either of passing judgment or of administering
punishment, so . . . the maintenance of law was a co-operative affair” (Turnbull, 1961, p. 110).
What is likely to go unnoticed in this situation is the role of traditions. The molimo
ceremony, including the obligation to contribute to the molimo basket, is itself a traditional
practice handed down from ancestors for generations to promote cooperation among
descendants. So too was the response to Cephu’s freeriding, both in regard to the amount of
freeriding to be tolerated and the extent, form, and duration of the punishment when that amount
exceeded the traditional limits of toleration.
The role of tradition in resolving disputes over such things as freeriding sometimes
includes the tradition of designating specialists specifically for the role of punishing a freerider
and deterring others from freeriding in the future. For example, Evans-Pritchard points out that
the ability of the Nuer leopard-skin chief to perform such a function partially relies on “the
sanctity of the chief’s person and his traditional role of mediator” (1940, p. 164). Shamans often
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employ traditional ways to correct behaviors such as freeriding, often during ceremonies
ostensibly to “cure” some alleged physical ailment: “illness does not mean so much an individual
event but a disturbance of social relations” (Bichmann, 1979, p. 177; see also Middleton, 1960;
Eliade, 1964; Lewis, 1971; Rasmussen, 1972; Turner, 1972; Siskind, 1973; Chagnon, 1983;
Grim 1983; Brown 1993; Edgerton 1993; Howells 1993). To restore cooperation from
disturbances caused by such things as freeriding, shamans draw upon knowledge of traditions,
often learned during “a period of instruction, during which the neophyte is duly initiated by an
old shaman . . . to learn the religious and mythological traditions of the tribe” (Eliade, 1964, pp,
110–11; see also Turner, 1964).
Although traditional moral codes prescribed punishment of individuals who failed to
meet their obligation to be generous to kin (i.e., freeriders), Ghoshal (1959, p. 25) reports that
even the punishments prescribed in codes were based on “benevolent principles.” Santos
Granero (1991, p. 226) reports that even today, tribal people such as the Peruvian Amuesha,
claim that “yi” (morality), which promotes such kinship responsibilities as love and generosity,
is crucial to the existence and perpetuation of harmonious and enduring social relationships (Coe,
1995).
Freeriding, if such a concept can even be considered to exist in such societies, would not
be seen as some deviation from an equal exchange. Instead, it would probably fall into the
category of “antisocial” behaviors that demonstrate “greediness or meanness” (Santos Granero,
1991, p. 226) in their “disregard for kinship duties and failure in one’s duties towards other
fellow Amuesha” (1991, p. 45). These immoral behaviors, the Amuesha report, were deterred
through punishment, not because they triggered evolved psychological mechanisms, but because
they violated the traditional moral code and thus precluded harmonious enduring relationships
(see Coe & Palmer, 2007; Coe, 1995).
The aim of traditional moral codes, even when they call for punishment, appears to be the
facilitating of enduring kinship relationships much more so than is the more punitive legal
systems in place to punish freeriders found among non-kin, which tend to disrupt enduring social
relationships (van Baal, 1981, p. 106; Coe, 2003). This kinship-based moral system is
significantly different from those found in in political economies (see Popkin, 1979), where the
influence of traditional moral codes on behavior has lessened and where interactions center on
the exchange of good and services with non-kin. This point is crucial to an evolutionary
understanding of freeriding for two reasons. First, there has not been enough time for natural
selection to design psychological mechanisms to deal specifically with freeriding in more recent
social environments. Second, it may only be in less traditional societies that our typical modern
conception of freeriding becomes fully applicable.
Trade between Non-Kin and Freeriding
As economic interactions with non-kin increase in frequency and the influence of
traditional moral codes decreases, several changes related to freeriding should occur. First, there
should be a noticeable difference in what is considered proper economic behavior in
relationships with kin and non-kin. Economic interactions with non-kin will be based on the
conceptions of fair (i.e., even) trade and feature an increased concern about the possibility of
freeriding. Economic interactions with kin, however, will still be influenced by traditional moral
codes. It is for this reason that if such a situation was to arise, even today, family law, not other
courts of law, would be the appropriate venue. Therefore, even today, there should be a clear
distinction between what is considered to be proper economic behavior when interacting with kin
and non-kin. Second, the increased contact with non-kin will often cause traditional moral codes
to diminish to the point where even interactions with kin will become less influenced by
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traditional moral codes. Sometimes, kinship formation may still exist even where kinship
function has fallen away, such as in the case of the corporate patrilineages of pre-communist
Southeastern China (Freedman, 1958), in which kinship organization was translated to
commercial organizations (Wolf, 1966, p.3). As this occurs, economic interactions with kin
should come to resemble economic interactions with non-kin (see Coe & Palmer, 2007).
The existence of different concepts of proper economic behavior applying to kin and nonkin is found in many societies. Clark (1989, p. 102) states that “Asantes confirm the contrast
identified by Bloch (1973) in their ideas and their practice. The eternal, undeniable aspect of
lineage ties makes non-specific reciprocity more plausible between kin than between spouses or
neighbors.” Briffault (1931, p. 57) states the difference more bluntly by describing two sets of
rules related to socioeconomic interactions, one of kindness, love, help, and peace applicable to
members of our own clan, tribe, or community, the other of robbery, hatred, enmity, and murder
to all the rest of the world.
Bohannan (1968, p. 107) observed that among the Tiv, the moral code stated that “one
does not lend to close kinsmen; one gives to them,” while “one ‘pawns to’ non-kinsmen.”
Pearson (1985, p. 77), in his account of economic exchanges among the Navajo of Fort Defiance,
Arizona, writes, “Kin relatives did not lend to one another items. The items were given. Neither
a return nor a repayment was expected.” Downs (1972, p. 26) states: “Within the domestic units
of the Navajo there is a great deal of sharing, so that the ledger often becomes obscured by the
overall obligation to support and assist relatives.” However, Downs, continues, “Outside the
network of kinship . . . quid pro quo is the rule.” Often this takes the form of what non-Navajo
might consider a blatant commercialism. Nonrelatives usually expect to receive money, food, or
other recompense for their assistance. Gustafsson (1992, p. 71) also states that
Relationships in the traditional social organization were based upon
the notion of kinship. All other people, from other villages or other
house communities, . . . with whom relationships through marriage
had not been established, were treated as potential enemies. In
trade every man, therefore, was a potential enemy.
We suggest that in contrast to traditional moral systems, in which the goal of resolving
conflict was the maintenance or restoration of cooperative relationships among kin, laws and
social norms in less traditional societies became aimed more toward preserving the nonviolent
trading and other relations between non-kin. For example, in descriptions of relationships
among non-kin, Linnekin writes that there is often critical gossip about “violations of reciprocity:
alleged obligations, unpaid debts, or anything that might create an imbalance in the relationship”
(Handy & Pukui, 1972, p. 186). Instead of being primarily motivated by a sense of obligation to
one’s ancestors, these newer forms of relations were often maintained nearly exclusively through
fear of punishment by the state: “Within the state, the social order, whatever it may be, is
maintained by the punishment of those who offend against the laws” (Herskovits, 1952, p. 330).
In such social environments, it is not surprising that even the definition of what constituted
“freeriding” would be very different in an interaction with a related individual than it would be in
an interaction with an unrelated individual. This illustrates how in traditional societies, it is
traditional moral codes, not a universal calculation of ‘evenness’ or ‘fairness’ automated by our
evolved psychological mechanisms, that determined what constituted proper and improper
behavior (e.g., freeriding). This is seen in Klass’s (1966, p. 957) statement about Bengal
villagers:
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[They] say that they cannot evaluate, they cannot deal with, the
category ‘good man’ outside the contexts of village and kin group.
Within these contexts the villager has obligations to others, and
these others have obligations to him; it is solely on the basis of how
a man fulfills his obligations to you that he can be evaluated.
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If our view of how traditional moral codes influenced economic exchanges is basically
correct, there should be many examples of societies in transition between the two kinds of value
systems. That is, many societies should be becoming more concerned with concepts like fair or
“even” trade and less concerned with moral obligations to ancestors. Amadiume (1987, p. 63)
writes a description of a society that appears to be experiencing the first effects of the weakening
of cultural traditions influencing economic exchanges:
As Akunne put it, ‘Christianity has reduced the people’s ritual
consciousness of Ibenne [a traditional moral oath], but the
corporate ideology of lineage morality remains. Ibenne is still
influential in commerce: individuals pool their capital to launch an
urban business after taking their Ibenne oath, in their rural home,
not to cheat one another. Ibenne is the foundation for trust and
confidence—a ritual agreement with a ritual sanction.’
As traditional moral codes continue to lose their influence on human behavior, even economic
exchanges with kin should increasingly be based on concepts such as even exchange rather than
on moral obligation. Thus, Clark (1989, p. 102) may be describing a very widespread situation
when she describes a society in the midst of shifting from a traditional society to a nontraditional
society:
Although a person ought and usually wishes to show generosity to
kin, he or she has considerable leeway as to which requests to
honor. Examples of self-sacrifice for kin coexist with evasions and
open refusals. Legitimate considerations include the recipient’s
ability to profit from and reciprocate the assistance, as well as
need. These conditionalities apply to virtually every kind of
support, both material and non-material, immediate and promised.
As expected, when relationships are decreasingly based on cultural traditions and increasingly
based on “even” trade, human behavior becomes more consistent with the predictions of
evolutionary psychology, which ignore the role of cultural traditions. We suggest that it is the
use of data from relatively non-traditional societies, in which there are many interactions with
nonkin that are not governed by traditional moral codes, that is responsible for the overlooking of
the role of cultural traditions among existing evolutionary explanations of freeriding, within
which such traditions have not been recognized.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on traditions or culture coming from the past, being
transmitted from one generation of kin to the next, and the role such traditions play in identifying
and dealing with freeriders. For decades, anthropologists focused on cultural traditions, pointing
out several facts that should be considered when attempting to explain human behavior. In this
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paper, we used these facts to understand freeriding behaviors and decisions regarding the
treatment of freeriders. First, cultural traditions have functions. While they may not always be
successful in fulfilling their functions, they serve a purpose or accomplish an aim. Second,
cultural traditions can persist across many generations, over hundreds, thousands, and even tens
of thousands of years. Third, throughout most of human history and prehistory, traditions were
transmitted from one generation of kin to the next. Considering that humans have long lived in
small groups of kin, this fact seems obvious. Finally, although there is cultural variation, certain
cultural traditions are common to all enduring societies. These traditions include the fact that kin,
both close and more distant, are identified culturally (e.g., body adornment) and there are moral
rules encouraging cooperation among those who are identified as kin. These moral rules also
specified methods for identifying and dealing with freeriders.
In the last decade, evolutionary psychologists have entered into the study of culture and
added a new dimension, namely a focus on psychological mechanisms, perhaps modules in the
brain, that when triggered by environmental factors, determine certain behavior. While advances
have been made using this approach, the influence of cultural traditions on human behavior is
just beginning to be incorporated into evolutionary explanations of behaviors including
storytelling (Coe et al., 2006), the visual arts (Coe, 2003), moral systems (Coe & Palmer, 2007;
Palmer et al., 2008), and others (VanPool et al., 2008). In sum, the archaeological and
ethnographic records have the potential to contribute significantly to an understanding of human
behavior, including freeriding behaviors.
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